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RESPONSE TO CONDITIONAL CROSS APPEAL
Appellee states that she is conditionally cross appealing in this case, with the
request that if this Court grants Keith's appeal and awards Keith half of the contested
accounts, that the trial court should revisit its alimony award to take into account any
change in the parties' need and ability to pay that may result from that change in the
award of the funds at issue here. Keith does not disagree that, should he prevail on his
appeal, the case should be remanded to the trial court with directions to revisit the
equitable division of the marital estate and his award of alimony.
However, Sharon's claim on appeal that she might be entitled to alimony is
unfounded insofar as she pied in her Petition that no alimony should be awarded to either
party [R.2], and she did not otherwise preserve that issue with the trial court. See Bell v.

Bell, 2013 UT App 248,128,312 P.3d 951, 957.
ARGUMENT
Sharon raises a number of abstract and convoluted arguments in her Appellee
Brief, most of which were not raised or factually supported at the trial. But this appeal is
not complicated. In its oral ruling and the written order, the trial court explicitly
acknowledged that Schedule A to the Smith Family Trust governed the disposition of the
two financial accounts at issue (a Zions Bank money market account and an LPL
brokerage account, both held in Petitioner's name, the "Brokerage Accounts"). The trial
4
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court interpreted the Financial Accounts Provision of Schedule A-which split all
vj

financial accounts equally-to not apply to the Brokerage Accounts. It erred. This
appeal begins and ends with that analysis. Sharon's other arguments are misdirected, and
do not address the actual issue on this appeal. Nevertheless, Keith will briefly address
them in order.

I. The Only Relevant Inquiry is the Trial Court's Erroneous Interpretation of
Schedule A.
Sharon makes only one argument that was actually addressed at trial-that the
check Sharon received should be considered her "interest" in her family limited
I..:;)

partnership, and therefore excluded from the operation of the Financial Accounts
Provision of Schedule A. This was the argument of Plaintiffs counsel, [R.181: 119], and
the subject of Plaintiffs testimony, [R.181 :25-29]. It is also the argument adopted by the
trial court, but it is incorrect, as Keith has already explained in his Opening Brief.
Contrary to Sharon's argument (and her mischaracterization of Keith's arguments
on this appeal), an interest in a limited partnership includes a right to receive
distributions, but the actual funds once distributed are not the "interest" in the

Vii

partnership. Once distributed, those funds are simply funds owned by the recipient, and
are fungible with all other funds owned by that person. To state that those funds continue
to be part of the partnership is incorrect and would lead to all kinds of legal mischief, and
no law exists to create such a result.

5
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Those funds certainly could be traced to the partnership, and Keith agrees that
those funds would generally be considered Sharon's separate property in the absence of
the Smith Family Trust (and particularly Schedule A) or other commingling, but it was
legal error for the Court to interpret those funds are being "Sharon's interest" in the
partnership, and therefore disregard the plain language of Schedule A of the Smith
Family Trust. The impact of Schedule A is that half of all financial accounts, including
the Brokerage Accounts, were Keith's separate property. The provision at issue, the
Financial Accounts Provision, reads as follows:
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or
accumu1ation in any and all other financial institutions in which new
accounts are opened in the future ... "
.• c

Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29 (emphasis added).
There are no missing tenns, uncertain terms, or other facial deficiencies in the
language, and Sharon has never argued that there are. As a result, the trial court should
have looked solely to the "plain meaning" of that language inside the four comers of
Schedule A. Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, 1127-28, 285 P.3d 815, 823; Makoff v.

Makojf, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974). The Financial Accounts Provision states that it
covers "all new accounts .. .in any and all other financial institutions in which new
accounts are opened in the future ... " This language is comprehensive and allencompassing, and leaves no room for any financial accounts to be excluded for any
6
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reason. The trial court erred in its determination that the Brokerage Accounts were
~

Sharon's separate property, and therefore erred in its distribution of those funds.
II. The Court Did not Make Any Equitable Distribution of the Brokerage Accounts.

Sharon argues that the trial court's ruling can be considered an "equitable
distribution" of the Brokerage Accounts to Sharon, and affinned on this basis. This
argument lacks any evidentiary support and cannot be the basis for affinning the trial
court's ruling. The trial court did not make any equitable distribution or any findings that
would support or lead to such a distribution. Indeed, the lack of findings sufficient to
support Sharon's argument would make such an undisclosed "equitable distribution"
reversible error as a matter oflaw. See Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, ,r 21, 312 P.3d
951, 956 (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)). The trial court's
ruling is clear that the award of the Brokerage Accounts to Sharon was governed by
Exhibit A to the Smith Family Trust, and that the trial court interpreted that provision to
not apply to the Brokerage Accounts. [R.181: 146 (Trial Tr.); R.165-66.] In the face of a
clear expression of the trial court's logic, this Court should not pretend that the trial court
engaged in a different wholly different analysis. The trial court's determination that the
Brokerage Accounts were Sharon's separate property was based on its erroneous
interpretation of the Smith Family Trust and, therefore, is error.

7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

III. Sharon's Alternative Interpretations of the Smith Family Trust Are Incorrect
and Were Not Supported at Trial.
Sharon proposes a unique interpretation of the Smith Family Trust and Schedule
A. These interpretations were not raised at trial, nor does Sharon cite to any record
evidence (other than the Trust itself) to support her arguments. Moreover, her arguments
should be rejected because they are not supported by the actual language of the Smith
Family Trust and Schedule A.
Most of Sharon's arguments ask the Court to disregard Schedule A as a separate,
self-contained document that merely lists assets governed by the language in the Smith
Family Trust. Ignoring Schedule A, however, is not tenable. Schedule A, though
denominated as a "schedule," is a stand-alone deed, signed separately and apart from the
Smith Family Trust. There is no basis to look beyond the }?_t;.ovisions of that deed to
interpret its meaning. That deed provided that they would equally split
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or
accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new
accounts are opened in the future ... "
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29 (the "Financial Accounts Provision"). That deed also mentions the
Limited Partnership, and states that Sharon alone is entitled to
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited
Pa11nership, an Arizona Limited Partnership.

8
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Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29. Contrary to Sharon's arguments, neither of these provisions is more
vtl)

"specific" than the other, and they both are entitled to equal effect. Nor do they overlap.
Again, contrary to Sharon's arguments, her "interest" in the limited partnership
includes a right to receive distributions, but the distributed funds are not themselves the
partnership interest. Once distributed, those funds are simply fungible money owned by
the recipient, separate and apart from the continuing partnership interest itself. Sharon
deeded half of all her then existing and future financial accounts to Keith, and when she
deposited that money in the Brokerage Accounts, half became Keith's separate property
under the plain language of Schedule A.
Sharon also argues that Schedule A does not have a separate line item for "future
accounts" and, as a result, it does not allocate future accounts at all. This argument
ignores the language of the deed, which identifies the existing accounts "together with"
all future accounts, and divides them equally between Keith and Sharon. There can be no
real dispute that the future accounts were to be treated identically with those specifically
identified. Sharon's argument merely attempts to "create ambiguity" where none exists.

Mind & Motion Utah Investments, LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ,I 42, ---P.3d---.
This is unavailing.
Leaving the language of Schedule A altogether, Sharon then argues that the
lul

"Additions to the Trust" provision should be interpreted to reach a result contrary to the
language of Schedule A. She misreads the language of the Smith Family Trust,
9
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attempting to reach the conclusion that any property Sharon chose to take possession of
automatically became Sharon's separate property in her "sub-trust", bypassing Schedule
A and the Smith Family Trust altogether. This is not how the Smith Family Trust works,
and certainly does not harmonize the Smith Family Trust provisions and Schedule A.
Instead, Schedule A deeded half of the Brokerage Accounts to Keith's portion of
the Smith Family Trust and half to Sharon's portion. The "Additions to the Trust"
language Sharon cites and emphasizes actually supports and gives effect to this
allocation:
Any additional prope11y received by the Trustee shall become a part of
the Trust into which it is transferred and shall become subject to the
terms of this Agreement.
Appellee Brief, pg. 15, citing R.78-79. The Brokerage Accounts were "transferred" in
.

.r

equal halves to each of Keith and Sharon' "sub-trusts" pursuant to the quit-claim in
Schedule A. Even if this Court were inclined to ignore Schedule A, the next sentence of
that same provision mandates the exact same equal division:
If such property is not specifically appointed to any particular Tmst, it
shall be allocated equally between the Keith L. Smith Trust and the
Sharon L. Smith Trust, if both of the Trustors are living, and otherwise
to the Shelter Trust set f011h therein.
Appellee Brief at p. 15, citing R.78-79. Accordingly, regardless of the method, the
outcome of the Smith Family Trust and Schedule A is an equal division of the Brokerage
Accounts, and the trial court's contrary distribution is error.

10
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IV. Sharon Did Not and Cannot Now Revoke Keith's Rights.
Sharon also argues that she was entitled, and remains entitled, to revoke the Smith
Family Trust and pull assets back out of Keith's separate portion of the Smith Family
Trust. Again, no evidence is cited that any "revocation" occurred, and certainly not one
that actually complied with the operative language of the Smith Family Trust. The
revocation language of the Smith Family Trust requires a written revocation (of which
~

there is no evidence) and only allows Sharon to revoke her portion of the Smith Family
Trust-not Keith's. The language Sharon cites states in full that
As long as both of the Trustors are alive, each of them reserves the right,
without the consent or approval of the other, to amend, modify or revoke
their separate Trusts under this Agreement, in whole or in part, including
this Trust, concerning the prope11y that each has contributed to the Trust,
in whole or in part, also including the principal and the present or past
undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation shall be by an
instmment in writing signed by the Tmstors and shall be effective upon
signing without notice to any successor Trustee.
Appellee Brief, pg. 28, citing R.80. The Smith Family Trusts only allows Sharon to
revoke her separate portion of the Smith Family Trust. It does not pennit her to reach
into Keith's portion to revoke it as well and help herself to his separate assets. Sharon
did not revoke the Smith Family Trust prior to funding the Brokerage Accounts, and
cannot do so retroactively. Notably, in another argument Sharon complains that Keith's
reading of Schedule A would render her unable to do anything with the distributions she
received from the limited partnership. This is untrue. Sharon could have properly
revoked her portion of the Smith Family Trust prior to creating those Brokerage
11
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Accounts, and possibly undone Schedule A. 1 However, she would also have to give up
any of the benefits of the Smith Family Trust. She chose not to do so, and cannot have it
both ways.

Conclusion
Because the Trial Court's Decree distributing the Brokerage Accounts was based
solely on its erroneous interpretation of the Smith Family Trust and Schedule A, the Trial
Court's ruling should be reversed and remanded to divide the Brokerage Accounts equally
between the parties.
DATED this 4 th day of April, 2016.
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C.

By:--L-~-----------. Michael D. Black
Attorneys for Appellant

··"

1

Keith expresses no opinion on whether or how Schedule A, a deed, could be undone, as
that was never raised at trial and is not a proper issue here.
12
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~
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Jaime Topham, Esq.
Law Office of Jaime Topham, PLLC
291 N Race Street
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION
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